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"MENTAL DISEASE": THE GROUNDWORK FOR
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Lovis H. SWARTZ t
Mental health and mental disease are concepts of great importance
to the twentieth-century legislator. The content and meaning of these
terms are also matters of concern to judges and attorneys, who at one
time or another must deal with persons suspected of having marked
psychiatric difficulties.
In providing for civil commitment, a New York statute defines a
"mentally ill person" as "any pers6n afflicted with mental disease to
such an extent that for his own welfare or the welfare of others, or of
the community, he requires care and treatment." I Similarly, the Fed-
eral Security Agency's Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill defines a "mentally ill individual" as "an individual having
a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his mental
health." 2 Obviously, these statutes cannot be administered without
reference to some further definition of mental disease and mental health.
The same concepts are also relevant to criminal law. The con-
cept of mental disease is a universal element in tests of criminal respon-
sibility. The McNaughten rule,3 the prototype of tests used in the
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Columbia University. Member, New York Bar. The author wishes to thank Pro-
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'N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 2(8). (Emphasis added.)
2 U.S. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION
OF THE MENTALLY ILL § I(a) (rev. ed. 1952). (Emphasis added.)
3 McNaughten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
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majority of American states,4 provides that "to establish a defence on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did
not know lie was doing what was wrong." ' More recently, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held ' that "an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product. of
mental disease or mental defect." 7 The term mental disease is also used
in the Model Penal Code:
Section 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsi-
bility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease
or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.'
One writer has stated the modern trend to be that "the concept of illness
expands continually at the expense of the concept of moral failure." '
To the extent that this is true, there is every reason to believe that
broader and more diverse measures of compulsory treatment will be
provided for in legislative enactment. Even those jurists who doubt
the justice of punishing the ill, are convinced that, under appropriate
circumstances, it is proper to compel those reclassified as sick to undergo
treatment.
This proposition is forcefully illustrated by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Robinson v. California.° The Court there held that
a California statute making narcotic addiction a crime " violated the
4 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, appendix A (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
5 10 Cl. & F. 200, 209, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). (Emphasis added.)
6 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7 Id. at 874-75. (Emphasis added.)
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). (Emphasis added.)
9 Wootton, Sickness or Sin?, 159 TWENTIETH CENTURY 433, 434 (1956). See
also Gruenberg & Bellin, The Impact of Mental Disease on Society, in LEIGHTON,
CLAUSENT & WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCMIATRY 341, 356-57 (1957):
"This extension of the concept of mental disorder accompanies an erosion of more
traditional values. Misbehavior tends to be regarded more as bad health than as
wrong."
10370 U.S. 660 (1962), rehearing denied, petition for abatement of judgment as
moot denied, 31 U.S.L. WEEx 3165 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1962), 111 U. PA. L. REV. 122.
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721, under which the defendant had been
convicted, made it a misdemeanor, punishable in no case by less than 90 days in jail,
"to be addicted to the use of narcotics."
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fourteenth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Although narcotic addiction most often involves an initial choice to
take drugs which many would find blameworthy,12 the Court held that
it was a disease, in itself no more punishable than the "crime" of having
a common cold.' 3 But the Court also recognized that its decision did
not insulate the defendant from all compulsory measures. In fact, the
majority and concurring opinions expressed approval of involuntary
commitment predicated on treatment, rather than punishment, of the
defendant's addiction to narcotics. 14
If this approach is to be successful, however, there must be ade-
quate legislation dealing with civil commitment. And if there is to be
new legislation, seemingly well defined terminology must be reevaluated
to determine its proper meaning in this new context.
One legal commentator has argued that "mental illness is a medi-
cal concept, and so it would seem self-evident that its definition should
come from the medical profession and not from either legislators or
judges." '- Lawyers and legislators may find this proposal super-
ficially appealing. Like other nonmedical men, they are inclined to
think of mental disease and mental health as scientific terms. The fact
is, however, that psychiatrists, as they use those terms, have not pro-
vided society with instruments of rational discussion. To a large de-
gree, the meaning of mental disease is personal to each practitioner. It
is no secret that there is considerable disagreement in contemporary
12 Mr. Justice Stewart, however, emphasized the possibility that addiction might
be innocently incurred. "Not only may addiction innocently result from the use of
medically prescribed narcotics, but a person may even be a narcotics addict from
the moment of his birth. [Citing medical references]" 370 U.S. at 667 n.9. Mr.
Justice Douglas made the same point, citing and quoting a newspaper accourit of
medical observations. "The first step toward addiction may be as innocent as a
boy's puff on a cigarette in an alleyway. It may come from medical prescriptions.
Addiction may even be present at birth." 370 U.S. at 670 (concurring opinion).
13 370 U.S. at 667.
14"[A] State might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those
addicted to narcotics. [Footnote by the Court: California appears to have established
just such a program in §§ 5350-5361 of its Welfare and Institutions Code. The record
contains no explanation of why the civil procedures authorized by this legislation
were not utilized in the present case.] Such a program of treatment might require
periods of involuntary confinement." 370 U.S. at 665 (majority opinion). "The
addict is a sick person. He may, of course, be confined for treatment or for the
protection of society." 370 U.S. at 676 (Douglas, J., concurring).
For further discussion of the Robinson case, see notes 74-78 infra and accom-
panying text.
15 Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 Onio ST. L.J. 1 (1960). Later
in the same article, Weihofen criticizes subsection 2 of § 4.01 of the Model Penal
Code. Id. at 6-7. The version of § 4.01 in the Official Draft of the Code, adopted
by the American Law Institute in 1962, is set forth in the text accompanying note 8
supra. That formulation is with two modifications the same as the one published in
Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955), to which Professor Weihofen responded: (1) in
subsection 1 the bracketed word "wrongfulness" was inserted after "criminality," to
indicate an option in the choice of words; and (2) the words "As used in this
Article' were added at the beginning of subsection (2).
For another reaction to § 4.01(2), see WiLmAs, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL
PART 536 (24 ed 1o611
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psychiatry about many things, including the classification of psycho-
logical conditions exhibited by patients."0 This disagreement is both
terminological and conceptual, and not merely a result of present limita-
tions in scientific knowledge. Moreover, apart from their participation
in legal proceedings, psychiatrists are not accustomed to thinking in
terms of whether an individual's conditi6n should be classified as
mental disease; they are more concerned whether the condition of the
individual examined fits into some diagnostic category, which is not
the same thing.
For legal purposes, however, there is an even more important
reason to scrutinize carefully medical definitions of mental disease. Any
definition of mental disease will involve value choices on questions of
social philosophy. But in a legal context, this concept can be and is
used as a basis for classification; it is a device by which to determine
the applicability of measures of involuntary detention, care, and treat-
ment. When decisions between competing values will broadly affect
society, they are clearly matters of public rather than purely professional
concern.
Therefore, this Article is directed particularly to the legislator who
may have to draft or vote upon proposed legislation dealing with civil
commitment, criminal responsibility, and conduct to be proscribed by
the criminal law. It is important that legislators have available a sys-
tematic analysis of the concepts mental disease and mental health, and
the systems of classification which are based upon them."' Legislatures
16 Everybody who has followed the literature and listened to discussions
concerning mental illness soon discovers that psychiatrists, even those appar-
ently sharing the same basic orientation, often do not speak the same language.
They either use different terms for the same concepts, or the same term for
different concepts, usually without being aware of it. It is sometimes argued
that this is inevitable in the present state of psychiatric knowledge, but it
is doubtful whether this is a valid excuse.
Stengel, Classification of Mental Disorders, 21 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
601 (1959).
17When Sir James F. Stephen inquired into the "relation of madness to crime,"
he found it necessary to attempt to answer the questions "What is the meaning of
the word mind?" and "What is a sane and what an insane mind?" 2 STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 128 (1883). Concerning the bearing
of such questions on the subject of criminal responsibility, he wrote: "Difficult and
remote from law as some of these inquiries may be, it is impossible to deal with the
subject at all without entering to some extent upon each of them." Id. at 129. The
following are Stephen's definitions of sanity and insanity, which he based on a reading
of medical works of his time:
What are sanity and insanity?
The answer is, that sanity exists when the brain and the nervous system
are in such a condition that the mental functions of feeling and knowing,
emotion, and willing, can be performed in their regular and usual manner.
Insanity means a state in which one or more of the above-named mental
functions is performed in an abnormal manner or not performed at all by
reason of some disease of the brain or nervous system.
Id. at 130.
"MENTAL DISEASE"
ought to be made aware that the concept of mental disease is. a nonlegal
means of classification, which must be modified for legal purposes.
Modifications may be based on statutes, precedent, and, most impor-
tant, on policy considerations relevant to a particular context.
To this end, I shall attempt to develop a reasoned analysis for
defining and classifying health and disease. Once the definitional ele-
ments involved are articulated, choices-for legal purposes-may more
rationally be made between conflicting concepts of mental health and
mental disease.
I. REDEFINITION OF MENTAL DISEASE AND MENTAL HEALTH
A. Present Usage
1. The "Social Definition"
The medical profession is not the only source of current definitions
of disease. The lay members of any society have numerous attitudes
and beliefs concerning what constitutes disease, the moral and em-
pirical content of that concept,' and how people should respond in their
actions and feelings to those who are ill.19 Collectively, these opinions
make up a body of social norms.20
In fact, there is constant interaction between the medical and social
concepts of disease. The idea of disease exists in the minds of doctors
18 See, e.g., Firth, Acculturation in Relation to Concepts of Health and Disease,
in GALDsTON, MEDICINE AND ANTHROPOLOGY 129, 140 (N.Y. Academy of Medicine
Lectures to the Laity No. 21, 1959).
19 The socially institutionalized expectations of others with respect to the sick
person, which tend also to be his expectations of himself, have been termed the "sick
role."
There seem to be four aspects of the institutionalized expectation system
relative to the sick role. First, is the exemption from normal social role
responsibilities, which of course is relative to the nature and severity of the
illness . ..
The second closely related aspect is the institutionalized definition that
the sick person cannot be expected by "pulling himself together" to get well
by an act of decision or will. In this sense also he is exempted from responsi-
bility-he is in a condition that must "be taken care of." His "condition!'
must be changed, not merely his "attitude." Of course the process of recovery
may be spontaneous but while the illness lasts he can't "help it:' . . .
The third element is the definition of the state of being ill as itself un-
desirable with its obligation to want to "get well." . . .
Finally, the fourth closely related element is the obligation-in propor-
tion to the severity of the condition, of course-to seek technically competent
help, namely, in the most usual case, that of a physician and to cooperate
with him in the process of trying to get well.
PARSONS, THE SocIAL SYsTEm 436-37 (1951).
20 For further discussion of various aspects of the social definition of mental
disease, see DAvis, HuMAN SociETY 257-59 (1949) ; LANDIS & PAGE, MODERN SOCIETY
AND MENTAL DIS.ASE 8-10 (1938) ; Parsons, Illness and the Role of the Physician:
A Sociological Perspective, 21 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 452, 456-57 (1951) ; Wood-
ward, Changing Ideas on Mental Illness and Its Treatment, 16 Am. SOCIOLOGICAL
REv. 443 (1951).
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as an imprecise mental composite of various particular experiences
gained in medical training and practice. To some extent, these experi-
ences will reflect the social norms of the society in which the doctor
practices. But as the profession collects and synthesizes the diverse
elements in its experience, it exerts a reciprocal influence on the very
norms from which it draws.
2 1
2. The State of Professional Usage
Current medical definitions of mental disease present both termino-
logical and conceptual problems. Doctors employ many words which
seem to have similar meanings--disease, disorder, disturbance, ill
health, illness, reaction, sickness, and syndrome.2 But few have at-
tempted either to relate the general meaning of those terms, or to ex-
plain the similarities and differences between them.
Members of the medical profession are aware that their terminology
is imprecise. One writer in a psychiatric journal-though not himself
a medical doctor-pointed this out in discussing normality, mental
health, and diagnostic decisions:
"Normality" is a highly personal concept. No generally ac-
cepted norms exist. Mental health is whatever the practi-
tioner thinks it is. Usually the technicians cannot verbally or
operationally define the concept on which their judgments are
based. "We have had years of experience," or "It is our
clinical judgment," might be their explanation. Many im-
portant diagnostic decisions in courts, hospitals, schools, and
private practices, which have a vital influence on the lives of
individuals, are made on the basis of such personal stand-
ards. -3
21 These ideas, the health and illness aspect of a culture, are never the sole
possession and certainly never the exclusive creation of those who devote
themselves to the healing arts. On the other hand, the medical culture of the
dominant healing profession (or professions, for they are not so united in all
as in our own culture) never coincides exactly with that of the lay world.
Hughes, The Making of a Physician--General Statement of Ideas and Problems,
14 Hu AmN ORGANIZATIo-4 21 (Winter 1956).
22 In this Article the word mental is used as a qualifying adjective, i.e., mental
disease. In recent medical usage there seems to be some increased tendency to use
psychiatric disorder as the generic term. This term is vague, because the interests
and activities of psychiatrists vary widely, but the word psychiatric is inclusive and
circumvents controversy. By retreating from the subject matter to the professional
group which studies it, the term does seem to work at least a tactical improvement
over the confusion resulting from variations and changing fashions in generic labels,
including inental disorders, nervous disorders, personality disorders, and behavior
disorders.
23 Eaton, The Assessment of Mental Health, 108 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 81, 84
(1951). See also Lewis, Health as a Social Concept, 4 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 109 (1953) ;
Marzolf, The Disease Concept in Psychology, 54 PSYCHOLOGICAL Rv. 211, 214
(1947); Redlich, in MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, INTERRELATIONs BETWEEN THE
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 118, 120 (1953) ; see text accom-
panying note 86 infra; Scott, Research Definitions of Mental Health and Mental
Illness, 55 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 29 (1958).
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This does not mean, however, that there is no area of agreement
among doctors. Formalized training and certain clinical tools, such as
psychological tests and psychometric measurements, do produce some
uniformity. As a result, certain very basic concepts are almost univer-
sally accepted. But the large fringe area remains uncertain.
The concept of mental disease is well-defined and beyond con-
troversial interpretation only in a central core of the concept,
i.e., with regard to such conditions in which the sense of real-
ity is crudely impaired, and inaccessible to the corrective influ-
ence of experience-for example, when people are confused or
disoriented or suffer from hallucinations or delusions ...
But outside of this inner core, there is a vast fringe area
of conditions which may, or may not, be considered to be dis-
eases of the mind. Are psychopathies, psychoneuroses (like
kleptomania) or perversions (like exhibitionism) diseases of
the mind? The definition of the term becomes arbitrary, and
the above questions will be answered differently by different
psychiatrists. Whether or not a psychiatrist is willing to clas-
sify any one of these conditions as diseases of the mind
depends more on his philosophy than on any factual question
that can be settled by observation and reasoning.4
This uncertainty within the medical profession limits the useful-
ness of its terminology and definitions to the legislator. Nor is there
any sign that more precision and agreement are forthcoming. As one
commentator has put it: "The concept of health is important to all
clinical specialties including psychiatry, but the subject seldom receives
much serious thought." 25
3. The Usefulness of Implicit Social and Medical Definitions
From the special point of view of the medical profession, the con-
cept of disease provides mental guidelines serving several useful pur-
poses. It helps doctors to determine who needs treatment and care. It
also aids in the formulation of sub-concepts defining standards of nor-
mality for particular activities included within the larger framework of
human endeavors. In addition, the concept of disease is a useful tool
24 Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA.
L. REv. 378, 384 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
25 Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN &
WILsoN, ExPLORATIONS IN SociAL PSYCHIATRY 138, 139 (1957). "In clinical medi-
cine, the terms 'normal' and 'healthy' are used interchangeably." Ibid. "Mental health,
as a scientific concept, does not now exist." Id. at 143. See Eaton, The Assessment
of Mental Health, 108 Am. J. PsYcHIATRY 81 (1951). See generally EVALUATION
IN MENTAL HEALTH (U.S. Public Health Service Pub. No. 413, 1955).
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in the study of the interaction between the individual, his physical en-
vironment, and the social setting, which in turn, may yield information
leading to the establishment of programs of disease prevention.
For society as a whole, disease is an even more basic concept. If
refined and clarified, it can be a highly useful device for identifying and
distinguishing between various kinds of human problems-between
value questions and other controversies with which man must be con-
cerned. It can enable us to characterize what we choose to mean by
"success" (health) and "non-success" (disease) as related to specific
problems. The distinction between health and disease is a means of
identifying a problem, communicating about it, and ultimately taking
concerted action against all of its manifestations.26
Not everything wrong with man, however, can usefully be classi-
fied as disease. Poverty, ignorance, crime, self-righteousness, and in-
difference may at times be evidence of disease; but none of them in
itself can usefully be so classified. To include them within the concept
of disease would only lead to confusion and reduce the effectiveness
of efforts to deal with each properly.
B. Redefinition and Classification
In order to analyze rationally the concepts mental health and
mental disease, it is first necessary to redefine them.27 The definition
offered in this Article is not, however, a total departure from tradi-
tional usage; it draws heavily on existing medical and psychological
sources. 28  But it does reject certain elements which have produced
confusion. In this respect, it is a stipulative definition-one by which
the author gives his own meaning for a word-rather than a lexical
definition in which the author reports the meaning of a word as it is
actually used.2
Clarification of the concepts mental health and mental disease is
fraught with practical and theoretical difficulties. Redefinition must
take place at a level of abstraction rather far removed from work-a-day
interests and needs. While a gap between scientific analysis and prac-
26 "[B]oth, health and disease, remain conceptions or ideas conceived with the
purpose of bringing system and order into facts unrelated in themselves, conceived,
above all, with the intention of outlining a plan of action which would lack coherence
were it directed towards the isolated facts themselves and not towards their inte-
grated totality." RIEsE, THE CONCEPTION OF DISEASE 97 (1953).
27 See ROBINSON, DEFINITION 66-72, 187 (1950).
28 See Seguin, The Concept of Disease, 8 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 252, 256
(1946) ; Lewis, supra note 23, at 117. See also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933);
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged ed. 1961).
29 See ROBINSON, op. cit. .rupra note 27, at 11.
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tical demands is common in many fields of study, and in some is of no
real importance, medicine and law are applied disciplines, dominated
by the viewpoint of practitioners rather than researchers. The at-
tempted definition, therefore, will appear to some to be overly academic
and philosophical. But an attempt will be made later to demonstrate
that the degree of abstraction is not as great as may first appear.
1. Proposed Definitions
Mental Disease: Any reaction of the organism, to external and
internal conditions, involving abnormality.
Abnormality: Any mode of any functions of the mind involving
a stated degree of pain or danger of death.
Mental Health: Any reaction of the organism, to external and
internal conditions, involving normality.
Normality: Any mode of each of the functions of the mind in-
volving less than a stated degree of pain and danger of death.
Functions of the Mind (mental functions) are not here defined in
general terms, but illustratively, by partial enumeration. (a) perceiv-
ing, (b) learning, (c) thinking, (d) remembering, (e) feeling, etc.30
2. Mental Disease and Mental Disorder
In present medical usage, a distinction is frequently made be-
tween disease and disorder. One definition of psychosis states that:
"It is not considered in keeping with the available facts to refer to a
psychosis as a disease, since the term disease is traditionally identified
with pathology of tissues. For want of a better term psychiatrists
speak of mental disorder when they refer to pathology of the psyche." "
However, in my view, disease in the generic sense should have no
etiological connotations, whether by reference to structural or func-
tional causation. The concept of disease is a theoretical or logical con-
struct which is not demonstrably valid or invalid, whereas etiology
is subject to empirical verification. It is important, therefore to dis-
tinguish between what is meant by mental disease, and how its occur-
30 Lewis, supra note 23, at 118.
31 HINSIE & CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1960). On the disease-
disorder distinction, see also Diseases of the Psychobiologic Unit, in AMA, STANDARD
NOMENCLATURE OF DISEASES AND OPERATIONS 85-92, 486-88 (4th ed. Plunkett &
Hayden 1952), reprinted in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N COMM.'. ON NOMENCLATURE
AND STATISTICS, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL-MENTAL DISORDERS (1952).
This nomenclature of the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric
Association-often referred to as "the Standard"--does not use the term mental
disease, but refers to diseases of the psychobiologic unit as mental disorders, and
subelassifies such disorders into various syndromes and reactions.
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rence is explained. Schizophrenia is no less a mental disease because
its etiology cannot be stated. The proposed definition, therefore, re-
jects the distinction between disease and disorder, and uses the former.
3. Mental Disease and Bodily Disease
Because of the paucity of data, it is more difficult to study mental
disease than physical illness. Present understanding of mental disease
is based on studies of hospital and private patients who present them-
selves for psychotherapy.3 ' Both the sample and those who investigate
it may be biased. Also, mental disease is sometimes expanded to in-
clude total behavior or conduct, whereas bodily disease is usually re-
garded as involving subdivisions of functioning3 For these reasons,
it has been urged that the two should be studied separately.
For purposes of definition and classification, however, a distinc-
tion between mental and bodily disease is unnecessary. Both present
the same theoretical problems and involve the same principles. 4
4. Disease Patterns
Mental disease can be subdivided into disease patterns, "a pattern
of factors which somehow hang together and recur more or less the
same, in successive individuals." it is at this level of specificity that
many practitioners, including psychiatrists, become most interested in
classifications3 But because of limited empirical knowledge and ex-
3 2 
LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN & WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 3 (1957) ;
Redlich, supra note 25, at 143. See also Ruesch, Communication and Mental Illness:
A Psychiatric Approach, in RUESCH & BATESON, CoMMuNIcATIoN 50, 71 (1951).
33 See text accompanying notes 51-61 infra.
34 Lewis, supra note 23, at 124 (1953). But see Redlich, in MILBANK MEMSORIAL
FUND, EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDER 94 (1950); Romano, id. at 60. See also
text accompanying note 39 in!ra.
35 King, What Is Disease?, 21 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 193, 197 (1954).
36But see Reid, Logical Analysis, 114 Amr. J. PsYcHIATRY 397, 400 (1957):
Some clinicians, to be sure, worry little about such dilemmas [of classi-
fication]. Long accustomed, perhaps, to the fog they work in, they have
learned somehow . . . to "muddle through." Since they believe that very
little follows, as regards prognosis or treatment, from applying most of the
standard diagnostic terms to a given patient, their relaxing motto seems to
be, "Why bother.?" What is needed rather, they declare, is increasingly
better descriptions (which are often clearer when couched in colloquial
language) of individual patients, their relevant histories and current be-
haviors, not more allegedly precise definitions, since the so-called precision
is largely illusory and futile anyway. So away with rigid definitional con-
straints on our free imagination, lest we become prisoners in our own verbal
strait jackets!
For a brief historical note on attitudes towards classification in psychiatry, see
Stengel, Classification of Mental Disorders, 21 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION
601, 602-03 (1959). See also PLUNKETT & GORDON, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND MENTAL
ILLNESS 18-27 (Joint Comm'n on Mental Illness and Health Monograph Series No. 6,
1960).
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cessive expectations,37 attempts at detailed classification are destinea to
run into difficulty. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to deal
with subcategories of mental disease.
5. The Treatment Criterion and the Nomenclature Criterion
It is sometimes suggested that the meaning of disease should be
related to treatment. At any given time and place, persons classified
as ill would be those who are actually being treated by physicians 38 or
who, according to the prevailing social or professional norms, ought to
be treated by a physician. Every proponent of this approach, however,
has left the meaning of treatment unexplained, perhaps because any
such definition inevitably becomes circular. Who is ill? Those per-
sons who ought to be treated. But who ought to be treated? The
proponents of the treatment criterion can only respond: Those persons
who are ill.
The treatment criterion opens up other more complex questions.
What is treatment? Who ought to be treated? What should be the
goal of treatment? When should treatment be terminated?
The word treatment is as vague as the word education. It stands
in a somewhat similar relation to disease and health as education does
to ignorance and knowledge. The goal of education is often more than
the mere imparting of knowledge; it may be the development of vari-
ous skills, and mental and personal qualities. Similarly, treatment may
do more than lead to health. It may be instrumental in cultivating
other modes of functioning.
In their well known study of mental disease in New Haven,
Connecticut, Hollingshead and Redlich stated, as one of the assump-
tions of their study, that:
[M]ental illness is defined socially; that is, whatever a
psychiatrist treats or is expected to treat must be viewed as
mental illness. This position is based upon the fact that in
37 See generally Reid, Logical Analysis, 114 A.m. J. PSYCHIATRY 397, 401 (1957):
[I]n the popular language of William James, what is the "cash value" of
our nosological categories? What are they supposed to do for us? Some
psychiatrists demand a good deal of them, it seems to me. For a common
opinion is that a diagnostic class-term should not only enable us to label a
disorder clearly, but that it should reveal-that is, plainly imply-the true
"nature" of the disorder, and also indicate its cause, or causes, and finally
point the way to its cure, or at least amelioration, by suggesting, even if it
does not explicitly state, what methods to employ in treating it. This is a
large order, and even if some doctors do order it, no one can deliver the goods.
38 "Nearly 90 per cent of mental illness escapes recognition and, consequently,
any possibility of treatment, control, or prevention." PLUNKEtr & GORDON, EPI-
DEMIOLOGY AND MENTAL ILLNESS 5 (Joint Comm'n on Mental Illness and Health
Monograph Series No. 6, 1960). "Because the treated rate is dominated by the
availability and caliber of treatment facilities and by the attitudes of the individual
and the community toward mental illness and treatment, it is a poor index of preva-
lence." Id. at 38. "Not all severe cases are treated, of course." Id. at 42.
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our society psychiatrists treat individuals whose behavior
would be ignored in a second society, punished by the crim-
inal courts in a third, and in still others given over to
priests.3 9
This formulation of the treatment criterion does not explicitly state
whose norms as to who ought to be treated are to prevail when there
is disagreement between laymen and psychiatrists, or among psychi-
atrists themselves. Nor is the reason advanced for adopting the
treatment approach persuasive. Differential social treatment or lack
of treatment is not peculiar to mental disease; it is also found in
physical illness. It does not seem useful to say that merely because
a certain society or social sub-group believes that a condition which we
regard as physical illness should be ignored or handled by priests, that
we should so regard it. The same is true of mental disease, even
though there may be wider disagreement as to its manifestations. The
treatment criterion and other unrevised social definitions of disease
would be acceptable only if there were no sound reason to disagree
with local judgments concerning what is disease.
The treatment criterion is further confused by overlapping of
professional activity.
In community psychiatry, especially in the children's field
• . . the psychiatrist is involved in matters in which other
professional people in the community have an interest. For
instance, educators are working constantly with children with
reading difficulties. Many of these children are now being
seen by psychiatrists. Are only those seeing psychiatrists
psychiatric "cases"? It is very difficult to tell "what is a
case" when various communities use many different re-
sources for handling, for instance, reading difficulties.4"
Overlapping professional activity is also common to the treatment of
adult offenders, juvenile delinquents, persons with marital difficulties,
those who have problems of vocational adjustment, and many others.
The nomenclature criterion of disease is a variant of the treatment
criterion. Its proponents argue that mental disease should be defined
as that which comes within the classificatory system of accepted psychi-
atric nomenclature, such as is found in the Standard Nomenclature of
Diseases and Operations.4
1 But again the definition is circular. What
30 HOLLINGSHEAD & REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 11 (1958).
40 Vaughan, in MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 136 (1953).
41 Diseases of the Psychobiologic Unit, in AMA, STANDARD NOMENCLATURE OF
DISEASES AND OPERATIONS 85-92, 786-88 (4th ed. Plunkett & Hayden 1952), re-
printed in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N COMM. ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL-MENTAL DISORDERS (1952).
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should be included in psychiatric nomenclature? The only answei 1s
mental disease.
It is possible to view psychiatric nomenclature as providing a
useful and exhaustive system by which to classify, at a workable level
of abstraction, all of the reasons for which individuals may be referred
or refer themselves to a psychiatrist.42 But the categories employed
must be so broad that they will enable psychiatrists to label the prob-
lem of every person who seeks their help.
Children who steal or have violent tempers or who wet their
beds; men and women who cannot get on with their spouses
or manage their love affairs satisfactorily; criminals con-
victed of various offences, as well as the victims of all manner
of irrational fears, anxieties and depressions (and some-
times also of quite rational ones)-all these are to-day liable
to be referred, or to refer themselves, to the psychiatric
doctor.43
The importance of a system of nomenclature to psychiatrists
should not be underestimated. It provides an important means whereby
doctors can communicate among themselves in seeking proper solu-
tions. But nonlegal definitions of disease cannot be used for legal
purposes without scrutiny and quite possibly some modification. This
is particularly true of a definition that assumes that those laymen who
seek psychiatric help have such a sound idea of the meaning of mental
disease themselves that the rest of society can rely upon it.
6. Process and Evaluation
a. Disease and Health Process
The theoretical or logical constructs disease and health have both
empirical and normative elements. Process is their empirical aspect-
a description and explanation of what is going on in the organism
under observation. Normality and abnormality, on the other hand,
42 This point apparently has not been explicitly developed in the literature, but
the need for extensive, uniform systems of labelling is well recognized. Quoting a
passage from 1 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MANUAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL
STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, INJURIES AND CAUSES OF DEATH Intro-
duction (1957), Stengel says: "[A] nomenclature, being 'a list or catalogue of approved
terms for describing and recording clinical and pathological observations,' has to be
extensive and unlimited in scope and detail to allow for the recording of the manifold
varieties of ill health." Stengel, Classification of Mental Disorders, 21 BuLL. WoRLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION 601, 616 (1959). (Emphasis added.) See also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N CoMM. ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL-MENTAL DISORDERS, at vi, 88 (1952). It is often assumed,
however, that anything that can be given a label is an instance of abnormality, disease,
disorder, morbidity, etc. Id. at vi; Ruesch, Conmunication and Mental Illncss: A
Psychiatric Approach, in RUESCH & BATEsoN, COMMUNICATION 50, 71 (1951).
43Wootton, Sickness or Sin?, 159 TWENTIETH CENTURY 433 (1956).
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while somewhat empirical, are the normative element-an evaluation
of what is going on.
The proposed definition does not distinguish disease from health
on the basis of the process involved in particular functioning. Inter-
action with the environment, lawfulness, the temporal dimension, and
changes in functions along a continuum of degrees of pain and danger
of death are characteristics of both.
b. Lazrfidness
Despite earlier controversy, it is now generally accepted that al-
though phenomena are classified as abnormal, they can still be lawful.
"[P]athological phenomena can be recognized as . . . lawful varia-
tions of the normal life process." 44
c. Sequenzce of Events
Disease is not static, but rather a sequence of states or events. Its
temporal or historical dimension is basic. 45  In fact, the temporal di-
mension is essential to life, whether the individual's functions are
classified as healthy or diseased.
d. Change
A living organism, whether healthy or diseased, is never in a
wholly static condition. Life itself implies change. What is meant by
change with reference to disease, therefore, must be other than, or in
addition to, movement along some postulated normal life-line of
growth, maturation, aging, and other normal cyclical changes. It re-
fers to alterations in the modes of functioning along a continuum of
pain and danger of death.
The theory of heredity-that the genetic endowment of an or-
ganism is fixed--does not detract from the importance of change.
In defining the concept of heredity . . . one must remember
that there is no inheritance of fully developed characters or
anomalies, but only a transmission of predispositions, that is,
of specific potential responses to the environment ....
[Thus] we define heredity as "the transmission of potential
physical and mental properties . . . through genes." "
Change, therefore, involves a shift from potential to actual abnormality.
44 GOLDSTEIN, THE ORGANISm 10 (1939).
45 Riese, History and Principles of Classification of Nervous Diseases, 18 BULL.
OF TrE HIsTORY OF MEDICINE 465, 494-95 (1945). See also RiEsE, THE CONCEPTION
OF DisEAsE 89 (1953).
46 Kalhnann, Modern Concepts of Genetics in Relation to Mental Health and
Abnormal Personality Development, 21 PSYCHIATRIC QUART. 535, 543 (1947). At
the end of the first sentence quoted, Kallmann cites GATES, HUMAN GENETics (1946).
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Abnormality is always the result of change. Change, however,
will not differentiate disease from health. While it is characteristic
of the onset of those modes of functioning classified as disease, change
is also typical of the restoration of those modes of functioning referred
to as health. Whether a particular mode of functioning, classified as
disease, is more changeable than one referred to as health depends on
the particular modes referred to in a specific situation.
It may be useful for some purposes to create a subcategory of
disease called defect. Defect would refer to certain modes of function-
ing which, because of structural or other factors, have reached a more
or less stationary level. This Article, however, will not discuss the
special problems of this subcategory.
e. Other Observations
Some writers 47 favor including "alteration in total equilibrium"
as an element of the concept of disease. The definition proposed here,
however, omits that factor because the meaning of "equilibrium" as an
empirical term has not in this context been sufficiently clarified.4
The proposed definition also omits explicit reference to the
temporal dimension, or the characteristic of change. The use of the
word reaction should sufficiently suggest both of these elements.
The definition refers to external and internal conditions in the
conjunctive rather than disjunctive because disease and health involve
organisms which are continually interacting with both parts of their
environment.49 Finally, the proposed definition omits any reference
to etiology.'
C. The Value Component of Mental Disease and Mental Health
Many of those who have thought about the concepts of disease
and health have had to struggle with questions of values. Personal
preferences differ among men; social approval or disapproval of
various types of functioning is not uniform throughout the world.
Also, human characteristics which in one situation would be an asset
may, in other situations, be a liability; no one is equally suited for
every task that might be required of him or which he may want to
undertake.
47 Seguin, The Concept of Disease, 8 PSYCHOSONATIC MEDICINE 252, 256 (1946);
DUNBAR, EMonToNS AND BoDuLY CHANGES 746 (4th ed. 1954).
48 See also Lewis, supra note 23, at 113.
4 9 See, e.g., PERKINS, CAUSE AND PREVENTION OF DIsEAsE 21 (1938); Seguin,
supra note 47, at 256.
50 The exclusion of etiological connotations from the term disease has already
been discussed. See pp. 397-98 supra.
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1. Subdivisions of Functioning
It is very important to distinguish subdivisions of functioning"
from behavior. Human functioning can be conceptualized into a num-
ber of subdivisions,3 2 even though such arbitrary units do not exist in
nature. Although the whole must be kept in mind 5 3 these subdivisions
have a pragmatic value. Behavior, on the other hand, is not a mental
function, but the product and evidence of what is occurring as a result
of bodily and mental functions.
Traditionally, disease has meant the disturbance of some subdivi-
sion of total human functioning, such as respiration, rather than total
functioning or conduct." Whatever the historical basis of this view-
point, it ought to be retained. It is a useful means by which to differ-
entiate problems of malfunctioning from the moral issue of what is
good or evil. The basic disagreement within segments of society over
moral issues is one of the motivating factors for attempting to redefine
mental disease in the present Article.
Variations in standards of social behavior, religious precepts, and
civil and criminal codes evidence the wide disagreement over conduct
norms. However, all men share, have shared, and are likely to con-
tinue to share a common concern to avoid and deal effectively with those
modes of sub-functioning which involve pain or danger of death. These
two values can, therefore, be included in a definition of mental disease
without provoking the controversy and confusion that other contested
values would.
2. Pain and Danger of Death
The two values upon which the concepts of disease and health are
herein based are the prolongation of life and the abolition of pain. Lit-
erally, disease means dis-ease. "The sphere of disease is the realm of
pain, disability and death, for its major groupings, while the minor
stages we can call (subject to quibbling) 'unpleasant' or 'disagreeable,'
or some such term." "' As another writer has said, "For most people,
over long stretches of time, ill-health has meant feeling ill, suffering
51 Lewis, supra note 23, at 118. Lewis uses the term part-function or function.
52
1My meaning might perhaps be made more precise by use of the term intra-
personal function. See Grinker, The Intrapersonal Organization, in GRINKER, TOWARD
A UNIFIED THEORY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3 (1956). I might then refer to mental
functions as intrapsychic functions. For an example of use of this latter term see
GIBBENs, TRENDS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 18 (World Health Organization Public
Health Papers No. 5, 1961).
53 See Lewis, supra note 23, at 112-13; see also King, What Is Disease7, 21
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 193 (1954).
54 Lewis, supra note 23, at 117-18.
55 King, supra note 53, at 195.
"MENTAL DISEASE"
pain or incapacity, and going in danger of death or mutilation." " If
neither pain nor danger of death is present in some stated degree, there
is no functioning classifiable as disease under the proposed definition.
Disability and incapacity, in turn, accompany those modes of function-
ing which contain these two elements.
57
The two normative elements included within the concepts of disease
and health are accepted both by physicians and the rest of society. It
it true that these values cannot be derived or validated empirically; they
were selected as a matter of preference. But by basing the concepts of
disease and health upon them, it is possible to distinguish disease from
the cultivation of functioning in accordance with other value goals.
This does not mean, however, that the choice of these values was with-
out any rational basis. They are unique in that they are universally
felt, whereas any other goals would be matters of dispute. In addition,
the choice ultimately is between the two values chosen and all others
of a particular culture relating to the meaning of life."
This does not mean, however, that men should always be satisfied
with functioning which is merely free from pain and which prolongs
life. Such functioning is not invariably the most desirable. In certain
situations, wisdom or duty may require a sacrifice of health to some
higher goal.59 But by removing all other values from the concept of
disease, legislators can recognize that the additional objectives are mat-
ters of personal or community preference, and deal with them accord-
ingly. In this way, it is possible to- evaluate intrapersonal functioning
independently of judging conduct according to public or private con-
duct norms.60
Of course, pain and danger of death themselves present problems.
Nevertheless, they can be used in an impressionistic way to distinguish
56Lewis, supra note 23, at 117. See also Redlich, The Concept of Normality,
6 AM. J. PsYcHoTnRAPY 551, 553-54 (1952).
57 According to the proposed definition, the term mental disease means that any
of the mental functions involves either a stated degree of pain, or a stated degree of
danger of death, or both. Mental health, on the other hand, means that each of the
mental functions involves less than a stated degree of pain and less than a stated
degree of danger of death.
58 See CAROTHERS, THE AFRICAN MIND IN HEALTH AND DISEASE 71 (World
Health Organization Monograph Series No. 17, 1953); DUBOS, MIRAGE oF HEALTH
218-19 (1959); Redlich, The Concept of Normality, 6 Am. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 551,
563 (1952); Ruesch, Communication and Mental Illness: A Psychiatric Approach,
in RUESCH & BATESON, CoMMuNicATioN 71-72 (1951), see text accompanying note 88
infra; Redlich, mspra at 555; Wilder, 6 Ax. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 557 (1952).
59 See COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 441-42 (2d ed. 1953).
60 See Wootton, Sickness or Sin?, 159 TwENTIETH CENTURY 433, 440 (1956):
Even in the honoured name of science, the lay community must not ab-
dicate from the right and the duty of choosing its own values. Indeed, any
attempt to do so would be to render ill service to science itself; for the
success of scientific investigation has always depended, and always must
denend, upon the complete exclusion of elements of value.
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what others call psychoses and severe neuroses from other modes of
functioning. 6'
3. A Sliding Dividing Line
The amount of pain and the degree of the probability of death
which divide health from disease depend upon the purpose for which
judgment is being made. Man constantly experiences some discomfort
and is always in some danger of death. The amount of either that we
are willing to tolerate will depend on what we are trying to accomplish.
Indefinite prolongation of life and abolition of pain have been
postulated as the goal, but nothing will be gained by setting the divid-
ing line between normality and abnormality, health and disease, imme-
diately below the optimum. On the other hand, nothing will be lost if
the line between health and disease is drawn sufficiently below the
optimum to accommodate specific purposes. The result will be that in
most instances a substantial proportion of the population will be re-
garded as normal and healthy.
4. Tasks and Environment Not Evaluated
Occasionally, functioning which entails considerable pain or danger
of death may be described as the normal reaction of a "normal" indi-
vidual to "abnormal" stimuli.' Apparently, what is meant is that
most individuals who are classified as healthy in a "normal" environ-
ment would react as did the individual in question when placed in a
second "abnormal" environment.
The multiple meanings of "normal" and "abnormal" cause confu-
sion and lead to difficult value questions. Should a man live in a
tropical climate where certain insects and microorganisms flourish, or in
a northern climate where these things are uncommon? Should he
expose himself or be exposed by others to military combat, flood, fire,
or other catastrophes? Should a man lead an easy, unhurried life, or
drive himself to the utmost? Logically these questions reduce them-
selves to the ultimate inquiry: What is the good or virtuous life and
what is its setting?
To avoid possibly unanswerable ultimates and thereby provide a
consistent meaning for disease and health, it is best to stipulate that
61 "[I]t seems justifiable to divide [mental] illness and [mental] health into two
categories-the first roughly coinciding with psychosis and severe neurosis, the second
including mild and transitory mental disturbances." Redlich, The Concept of Health
in Psychiatry, in LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN & WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSY-
cHIATRY 138, 158 (1957) ; see text accompanying note 87 infra.
62 The problem is best illustrated in Tinklepaugh, When Is Normal Normal?,
69 SCIENCE 428 (1929).
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these concepts only involve the abolition of pain and avoidance of death
in whatever environment particular tasks or activities are undertaken
by the individual being classified. This approach obviates any need to
determine whether it is the environment, the task, or the individual
that is abnormal.
5. Specifying the Relevant Facts
The concepts of disease and health are used as means by which to
evaluate the intrapersonal functioning of individuals who are doing
something, whether resting or performing, in interaction with their
environment. The factual picture will vary depending upon the char-
acteristics of the person involved-his age, sex, previous history-, the
types of activities or tasks in which he is engaged, and the character-
istics of his environment.' The individuals who are being studied
may be referred to as the population. The environment within which
they function is not only physical, but also human and nonhuman. It
may contain plant and animal life of all sorts, as well as other humans
with their own actions and expectations. In addition, the factual pic-
ture will vary according to where the line between health and disease is
drawn. In order to be accurate, it is important to dercribe the total
picture of population, environment, and dividing line with sufficient
precision that it can be compared with similar settings, but not confused
with those that are dissimilar.
6. Cultivation of Functioning
Under the proposed definition, treatment which does not seek solely
to mitigate pain and prolong life cultivates functioning-that is, seeks
to achieve additional goals. Illness and disease have been used as labels
to increase public acceptance of what doctors consider to be the full
potential of medical and psychiatric treatment to create well being. In
order to mark out the neuroses and behavior problems as legitimate
areas of psychiatric concern, it is simplest to refer to them as disease.
To the extent that this designation is accepted by the rest of society,
the sick role will apply. When someone is considered ill, pressure is
put on him by his fellows to seek medical help. As a result, the anxious
person, the alcoholic, and the parent of a child with a behavior problem,
instead of relying on nonmedical alternatives for dealing with his
difficulty, will feel compelled to seek the assistance of a physician.64
63 See, e.g., Lewis, Health as a Social Concept, 4 BRIT. J. SOCIOLOGY 109 (1953);
RYLF, CHANGING DISCIPLINEs 77 (1948).
64 See note 19 supra. Compare Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 113, 118 (1960):
The notion of mental illness thus serves mainly to obscure the everyday
fact that life for most people is a continuous struggle, not for biological
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Even if the medical profession has little to offer a particular patient, it
may, by an adjustment of labels, tell the public that a moralistic attitude
towards his case is inappropriate.
Of course, cultivation of functioning, when defined as the pursuit
of additional value goals, can be beneficial. There is no reason why a
patient and doctor, who have voluntarily and mutually agreed on the
goals which they will pursue, should not carry treatment beyond the
reduction of a certain amount of fear or the elimination of a threat to
life. By cosmetic surgery or by psychotherapy, the patient may perhaps
be made a more attractive person. Within the bounds of legal and
ethical rules, doctors and other social agencies may be able to aid those
who seek their assistance to lead happier and more productive lives."5
In fact, through such diverse mechanisms as education and imprison-
ment, the state may actually compel the cultivation of functioning al-
though the subject is not in agreement with the goals.
But, since disputed values may be involved, they should be dealt
with as such rather than obscured by the titles disease or health."6 It
is impossible and certainly undesirable to mask the nature of particular
value preferences. There is no reason why it should be more difficult
without the label illness than with it to convince the public that the
"normal neurotic," the alcoholic, the repeated offender, and the homo-
sexual have problems for which medical and psychiatric treatment are
effective. The label, in fact, may repel as many patients as it attracts.
In addition, it is not entirely clear that the sick role is always beneficial.
survival, but for a "place in the sun," "peace of mind," or some other human
value. For man aware of himself and of the world about him, once the needs
for preserving the body (and perhaps the race) are more or less satisfied,
the problem arises as to what he should do with himself. Sustained adherence
to the myth of mental illness allows people to avoid facing this problem,
believing that mental health, conceived as the absence of mental illness,
automatically insures the nmaking of right and safe choices in one's conduct
of life. But the facts are all the other way. It is the making of good choices
in life that others regard, retrospectively, as good mental health 1
65 "Psychoanalysis has little resemblance to most forms of medical treatment;
its methods are educational and its goals prescribe a new pattern of living and a
reorientation in many basic values. Another aspect of such analytic treatment is
its interminability. . . . The concept of health thus becomes an ideal which is never
completely reached." Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in LEIGHTON,
CLAUSEN & WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 138, 158 (1957). See
also Lewis, supra note 63, at 120.
66 Compare Wootton, Sickness or Sin?, 159 TWENTIETH CENTURY 433, 436-37
(1956):
It follows that somewhere, somehow, there must be a recognizable dis-
tinction between those troublemakers and those troubles which are properly
the doctor's business and those which (even though they may get wished
upon him) are not. . . . Hence the dilemma: either our psychiatrist must
be spending his time upon those who are not really ill at all (a waste, surely,
of his special talents?) or our conception of mental illness must be much too
narrow, and needs to be widened to include pretty well everyone who is in
trouble of any kind.
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It may, in certain circumstances, actually worsen a condition or give
rise to further complications.
7
D. Mental Health and Its Relation to Mental Disease
It is quite common for doctors and laymen to think of disease and
health as dichotomous terms. Health is often defined as the absence
of disease.6" This approach, however, wrongly suggests that disease
is a thing that can either be present or absent.6" In addition, it de-
scribes health only in negative terms. The definition here proposed is
not completely free of this dichotomous view, but it does attempt to
explain disease and health as two parts of a single continuum across
which a dividing line has at some point been drawn."0 Health is re-
lated to mental functions evaluated in terms of pain and danger of death
in the same way as is disease. The proposed definition makes clear
that the line between the two may vary. Finally, it makes it possible
and meaningful to speak of degrees or levels of health."1
Throughout history it has also been common to think of health in
a far more ambitious way. Etymologically, to heal means to make
whole. The Constitution of the World Health Orgai.ization defines
health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." T2 But again the
definition has gone beyond the problem of health and disease and has
entered the realm of cultivation of functioning. The better approach is
to "keep social well-being conceptually distinct from health so that their
interrelations can be better observed and analysed." 7'
- 6 7 "[W]e may wonder to what extent the process of self-perception as mentally
ill makes the patient sicker and to what extent this is a necessary phase in recovery?"
Gruenberg & Bellin, The Impact of Mental Disease on Society, in LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN
& WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 341, 349 (1957).
68 See, e.g., Redlich, The Concept of Health in Psychiatry, in LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN
& WILSON, EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 138, 140, 143 (1957).
69 "The infestation or 'devil-possession' theory, this ontological conception of
mental disease as a thing present or not present in the individual, is an erroneous,
medieval and pre-medieval concept which persists in the minds of many laymen, not
a few lawyers, and even a few physicians in spite of all sorts of effort to eliminate
it." Karl Menninger, Community Attitudes Vis-a-Vis the Offender, in ABA SECTION
OF CRIMINAL LAw, PROCEEDINGS 83, 85 (1958). See also RIsE, THE CONCEPTION
OF DISEASE 78-81 (1953) ; Seguin, The Concept of Disease, 8 PSYcHOsOMATIC MEDI-
CINE 252-53 (1946).
70 See Lewis, supra note 63, at 111.
71 See generally MEASUREMENT OF LEvE.ts OF HEALTH (World Health Organi-
zation Tech. Rep. Series No. 137, 1957).
7 2 VORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION BASIC DOCUMENTS 1 (12th ed. 1961).
73 Lewis, supra note 63, at 110. See also Firth, Acculturation in Relation to
Concepts of Health and Disease, in GALDSTON, MEDICINE AND ANTHROPOLOGY 129,
142-43 (N.Y. Academy of Medicine Lectures to the Laity No. 21, 1959).
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II. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL
DISEASE AS REDEFINED
A. The Importance of Classification as Disease: Robinson v. California
The characterization of narcotic addiction as an illness in Robin-
son v. California " leaves no doubt about the importance of the concept
of disease for courts and legislatures whenever compulsory measures,
particularly penal sanctions, are being considered. Yet the Robinson
opinion contains no careful analysis of that concept. The majority
speaks of narcotic addiction as an illness, which indeed may be the
better view, but it fails to cite any medical authority for that proposi-
tion. Nor is the system of classification seized upon subjected to any
reasoned analysis. Instead, the majority of the Court brushes aside
any doubts by referring to a concession made in the state's brief and a
statement made by the Court itself thirty-seven years earlier, that per-
sons addicted to narcotics "are diseased and proper subjects for [medi-
cal] treatment." " Only in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas is there any mention of the uncertainty beclouding the char-
acterization accepted by the majority. "Some say the addict has a
disease. . . . Others say addiction is not a disease but 'a symptom
of a mental or psychiatric disorder.' " 76
The new importance of the concept of disease to the law is further
illustrated by the fact that the Court could have reached the same result
74370 U.S. 660 (1962), rehearing denied, petition for abatement of judgment as
moot denied, 31 U.S.L. WEzic 3165 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1962), 111 U. PA. L. REv. 122.
75 370 U.S. at 667 n.8, citing Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
In that case the conviction of a physician for violation of the Harrison Narcotic Law
was reversed by the Court on the ground that it had not been alleged or shown that
the defendant's conduct (in giving a known addict four tablets containing morphine
for the sole purpose of relieving conditions incident to addiction and keeping the
addict comfortable) involved acts which were other than acts coming within the
category of medical practice in good faith according to medical standards. The
problem of classification upon which the result on appeal turned related not to the
classificatory category of disease but rather of medical practice. On this point, Mr.
Justice McReynolds said, "What constitutes bona fide medical practice must be
determined upon consideration of evidence and attending circumstances." 268 U.S.
at 18. The Court in Linder used the treatment criterion of disease as a step toward
the result, which was based on the conclusion that conduct outside the limits of
medical practice had not been shown. The concept of medical practice was relevant
because the Court construed the Harrison Law as not involving the intent on the
part of Congress to regulate medical practice in the states.
76 370 U.S. at 671-72 (Douglas, J., concurring). See Treatment of Drug Addicts:
A Survey of Existing Legislation, 13 INT'L DIGEST OF HEALTH LEGISLATION 3, 4
(1962) :
In certain countries . . . drug addiction is considered to be an offence
involving severe penalties, whilst in others it is regarded by the population
as being little more than a "normal" habit. It would seem, however, that in
many countries, the current attitude towards the problem is undergoing a
change. Indeed, it is becoming more and more recognized that the drug
addict is a sick Derson who. above all else. is in need of suitable treatment.
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without employing the reasoning it used." The crime of which the de-
fendant was convicted did not require proof of any act or omission. But
actus reus would seem to be a necessary element of any crime. 78  The
moral idea that it is wrong and uncivilized to punish the sick merely for
being sick, however, had such a powerful hold upon the minds of the
majority, that they chose not to rely on this more traditional approach.
B. Legislative Policy Implications of Classification as Disease:
The Wolfenden Report
The Wolfenden Committee's Report 11 on homosexuality is an ex-
cellent example of a careful attempt to limit the scope of the concept of
disease as it is socially or medically defined. The Report considered
what legal consequences ought to follow, with respect to definition of
offenses and the treatment of offenders, if homosexuality is regarded
as a disease. The Committee had been directed to consider "the law
and practice relating to homosexual offences and the treatment of per-
sons convicted of such offences by the courts" and to "report what
changes, if any, are . . . desirable." " Its Report treated the question
of whether homosexuality is a disease as academi" rather than
practical. 8 '
Even if it could be established that homosexuality were a dis-
ease, it is clear that many individuals, however their state is
reached, present social rather than medical problems and must
be dealt with by social, including penological, methods. This
is especially relevant when the claim that homosexuality is an
illness is taken to imply that its treatment should be a medical
responsibility. Much more important than the academic ques-
tion whether homosexuality is a disease is the practical ques-
tion whether a doctor should carry out any part or all of the
treatment.
82
The Committee did conclude that homosexual behavior between
consenting adults in private should no longer be made criminal. How-
77 "We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal,
even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty
of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 370 U.S. at 667. (Emphasis added.)
7S See KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 14 (17th ed. Turner 1958) ; PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 470 (1957); WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw-THE GENERAL PART, at 1,
10-11 (2d ed. 1961). See also Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Con-
dition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203 (1953).
79 Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report, CMD. No. 247
(1957). The Committee is often referred to by the name of its chairman, Sir John
Wolfenden.
80Id. 1, at1.
Sl Id. 111 31, 191, at 15, 66.
82Id. 31, at 15.
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ever, it assumed that certain other homosexual conduct would remain
punishable, such as between an adult and a child, or in cases not involv-
ing consent. The Committee went on to discuss a wide range of cor-
rectional measures that would be possible within the existing structure
of the law, and also recommended improved psychiatric care in prisons.
None of these conclusions or recommendations, however, was based on
any finding that homosexuality is a disease. In fact, the Committee's
opinion was quite to the contrary.
[T]he evidence placed before us has not established to our
satisfaction the proposition that homosexuality is a disease.
This does not mean, however, that it is not susceptible to
treatment. As we explain elsewhere, psychiatrists deal regu-
larly with problems of personality which are not regarded as
diseases. It seems to us that the academic question whether
homosexuality is a disease is of much less importance than the
practical question of the extent to which, and the ways in
which, treatment can help those in whom the condition exists.83
The Committee also touched upon the relationship of the concept
of disease to capacity to control behavior, and to responsibility. "The
claim that homosexuality is an illness carries the further implication
that the sufferer cannot help it and therefore carries a diminished re-
sponsibility for his actions. Even if it were accepted that homosexuality
could properly be described as a 'disease,' we should not accept this
corollary." 84
C. The Impact of the Proposed Definition
In actual application to law, the proposed definition of mental dis-
ease and mental health could be used to make the division-made by
83 Id. g 191, at 66.
84 Id. 1111 32-33, at 15-16. The Committee continued as follows:
There are no prinza facie grounds for supposing that because a particular
person's sexual propensity happens to lie in the direction of persons of his
or her own sex it is any less controllable than that of those whose propensity
is for persons of the opposite sex. We are informed that patients in mental
hospitals, with few exceptions, show clearly by their behavior that they can
and do exercise a high degree of responsibility and self-control; for example,
only a small minority need to be kept in locked wards. The existence of
varying degrees of self-control is a matter of daily experience-the extent to
which coughing can be controlled is an example-and the capacity for self-
control can vary with the personality structure or with temporary physical
or emotional conditions ....
Some psychiatrists have made the point that homosexual behavior in
some cases may be "compulsive," that is, irresistible, but there seems to be
no good reason to suppose that at least in the majority of cases homosexual
acts are any more or less resistible than heterosexual acts, and other evidence
would be required to sustain such a view in any individual case.
Ibid. Compare Scott, Psychiatric Aspects of the Wolfenden Report, 9 BRIT. J.
DELINQ. 20, 28 (1958).
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others on the basis of a somewhat different analysis-between psychoses
and severe neuroses, on the one hand, and other ways of functioning,
on the other.85
[W]e know what the seriously ill person in a given cul-
ture is. That we do know. In this respect we agree, inci-
dentally, with policemen, with the clerk in the drug store.
Our crude diagnostic criteria are reasonably similar.
What the normal and the normal neurotic is we don't
know. However, . . . the difference is not between the
various shades of gray in the neurotic scale where we can
draw a line, but the difference is between the severely ill on
one side, and between the normal and the neurotic on the
other side..
[W]e could, by operational criteria, say this: there is
one group, the severely abnormal, which is characterized by a
definite urgency to enter treatment. They have to go to a
psychiatrist. If they don't go to a psychiatrist, a situation
arises which is as serious as in any other medical emergency.
If we have too many schizophrenic people around the popula-
tion, there is danger, and society responds to this by legaliz-
ing removal of the seriously ill. For the neurotic population
no such urgency exists. The relationship between a neurotic
patient and his therapist is very much a voluntary one. No-
body can force the patient to seek treatment.
86
The proposed definition would include the psychoses and severe
neuroses as disease, by saying that in psychotic conditions, where the
sense of reality is crudely impaired, 7 there is increased danger of death,
and often substantial pain or distress. In severe neurosis, there is pain
from acute anxiety, and in some cases there may also be inability to
deal with some of the ordinary hazards of modern civilization that
threaten life and limb. Pain and danger of death, however, are not in-
volved to the same degree in other modes of mental functioning.
When specifically related to questions of commitability and irre-
sponsibility, one of the effects of the proposed definition on law would
be to provide a more explicit, rational basis for defining the category
of persons who may be subjected to involuntary hospitalization or
851 think of the line between mental health and mental disease as adjustable.
Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the category of mental disease might also
be made narrower or wider than suggested above.
88 Redlich, in MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND, INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND PSycHIATRIC DISORDERS 120-21 (1953). See also Redlich, The
Concept of Normality, 6 Am. J. PSYCHornERAPY 551, 564 (1952): "Repeatedly in
this paper the statement has been made that the severely disturbed group-the ex-
tremely abnormal which is not identical with psychotic reactions but includes the
severely neurotic reactions--can usually be clearly recognized."
87 See Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U.
PA. L. REv. 378, 384 (1952), quoted in text accompanying note 24 supra.
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treatment as criminally irresponsible. Currently, in the application of
tests of commitability and irresponsibility, mental disease is said to mean
psychosis. But by using the definition suggested, a somewhat larger
group would be included as potentially commitable or irresponsible.
Not included, in the absence of explicit legislative provisions, however,
would be those classified as having conduct disorders-habitual of-
fenders and other sociopaths-exhibitionists, homosexuals, prostitutes,
and those engaging in compulsive stealing.
It is also important to consider the effect of the proposed definition
on legislative pursuit of other goals of functioning by use of compulsory
measures. The stringent approach advocated here concerning the
values to be included in the concepts of mental disease and mental health
may appear more persuasive when the alternatives are considered. The
basic question is which of the many goals clamoring to be included in
the concept of disease would not become stifling, even tyrannical, if it
were the pivot upon which commitment to a mental hospital, for ex-
ample, was made to turn. Consider the legal implications of a state-
ment-not addressed in the original to any legal context-which de-
fines health according to the "physical and mental processes which
seem to be desirable to the system in power."
The nature of pathology implies the existence of a concept of
health, and all medical and psychiatric thinking is geared
toward helping the patient achieve health. Mental health is
obviously defined in terms of the culture in which the patient
and the therapist live. The concept of health can be viewed
as a structural assumption describing a series of conditions
pertinent to processes which prolong the optimal functioning
of an individual. The concept of disease, in contrast, denotes
deviation from optimal functioning through the introduc-
tion of a number of reversible or irreversible processes. In-
asmuch as health is defined in each culture in terms of those
physical and mental processes which seem to be desirable to the
system in power, the American concept of health can be de-
rived from that which will be said about the American culture
as a whole. To be able to compete and to successfully grasp
the opportunity which equality provides for the individual de-
fines the essential meaning of living in America. In order to
do these things, an American citizen must be strong, self-
reliant, independent, free of physical disease, able to get along
in a group, ready to adapt to emergencies, capable of caring
for children and the family, and not a public liability. The
healthy individual is expected to use his power for his own
benefit with restraint and wisdom.
88
88 Ruesch, Cominunication and Mental Illness: A Psychiatric Approach, in
RuEscH & BATmsoN, CoMMuNIcAT N 71-72 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
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Clearly, the applicability or nonapplicability of compulsory meas-
ures ought not to depend on such criteria as ability "to get along in a
group," not being "a public liability," or use of power for one's own
benefit "with restraint and wisdom," no matter how enthusiastic some
members of society may be about those goals in relation to voluntary
cultivation of functioning.
It is not necessary to conclude, however, that the legislature can-
not use compulsory measures to cultivate other modes of functioning
not based on the values of avoiding pain or danger of death. The
argument of this Article is not to that effect.
The argument made here is that if the legislature wishes to pursue
values other than the universally accepted ones of avoiding pain and
death-by civil commitment procedures, criminal responsibility rules,
or correctional arrangements-it should face those value problems ex-
plicitly by enacting specific provisions for each category of cases. If
additional classes of persons other than those suffering from mental
disease, as here redefined, are to be subjected to restraint and com-
pulsory treatment, the legislature, which in its representative capacity
speaks for society, should face up to those problems explicitly, and
specifically and unambiguously state what is to be done.
The values dealt with in such explicit provisions, might conceiv-
ably have to do with: (a) mature sexual goals as opposed to those
concerned with sexual relations with members of the same sex, with
children, or for hire; (b) mature goals in the management of tensions
as opposed to release of tensions through excessive use of alcohol 8" or
barbituates, or use of narcotics; " (c) the goal of reality-oriented
acquisition of property as opposed to senseless compulsive stealing
under circumstances where detection and apprehension are highly
likely, or where a motive for gain is lacking; (d) the goal of living a
constructive life as opposed to a life characterized by x number of con-
victions of felony, or y number of convictions of any offense, or z num-
ber of convictions of a particular kind of offense within a specified
period of time. Persons in any of these categories might be made
commitable, declared irresponsible, or, on conviction of a related
offense, sentenced to a greater or shorter term or to a special treatment
facility. Needless to say, these possibilities are mentioned here only
for purposes of illustration, without taking any position on their
desirability.
89 See LINDMAN & McINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 82-91
(1961) (Table II-J, Statutory Definitions of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts; Table
II-K, Hospitalization of the Mentally Deficient, Epileptics, Alcoholics, and Drug
Addicts).
90 Ibid. See also Treatment of Drug Addicts: A Survey of Existing Legislation,
13 INT'L DIGEST OF HEALTH LEGISLATION 4 (1962).
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D. Recapitulation: Some Legally Important Characteristics
of Mental Disease
What are the characteristics and logical implications of mental
disease and mental health, as here redefined, which are most likely to
be important for the structuring and application of compulsory legal
measures?
(1) The concepts of mental disease and mental health are sus-
ceptible of explicit definition supported 
by reasoned analysis.
(2) The concepts of mental disease and mental health can be
used as devices for legal classification. Even as implicitly defined in
present usage, these concepts are used for purposes of civil commitment
and in tests of criminal responsibility.
(3) The classificatory system of mental disease and mental health
includes value preferences.
(4) The values included within the classificatory system of
mental disease and mental health relate to the goals of avoiding death
and abolishing pain. They do not include other attributes and goals
which from time to time may be considered valuable. A psychological
or physiological condition, for example, involving sexual preference
for members of one's own sex would not, as such, be classifiable within
the category of mental disease."'
(5) Norms relating to conduct fall outside of the concepts of
mental disease and mental health. Habitual stealing, for example,
would not, as such, be regarded as coming within the category of
mental disease or ill health. The norms of the conceptual system of
mental disease and mental health evaluate intrapsychic functioning.
(6) The concepts of mental disease and mental health do not
include hypotheses as to etiology. The question of whether a par-
ticular mode of functioning is due to psychic, somatic, or unknown
causes is not relevant to the question of whether that mode of function-
ing comes within the category of mental disease.
(7) The body of social beliefs and expectations concerning mental
disease, including the sick role,
92 do not form part of that concept. That
is not to say, however, that these social views should not be taken into
account in formulating legal policy. That is another matter to be
dealt with in terms of specific legal problems.
91 Compare discussion of the subject by the WNolfenden Committee, pp. 411-12 supra.
92 See notes 19, 84 supra.
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(8) The concepts of mental disease and mental health have b,.en
here defined without reference to treatment. 3  The question of what
cases should be treated is a separate problem of considerable com-
plexity.94 The position taken here, however, is that the area of treat-
ment and scope of prudent use of specialized medical and auxiliary
resources extend beyond the classificatory system of health and disease.
Within the limits set by law and professional ethics, they include the
pursuit of other goals deemed valuable by the individual or society.
III. THE LEGAL DECISION MAKER, THE LEGISLATOR, AND THE
MEANING OF MENTAL DISEASE
If legislators and judges are to deal properly with civil commit-
ment, criminal responsibility, and the definition of crime, they must
have a sound understanding of what is meant by -mental disease.
The judge, juror, hospital superintendent, or certifying physician,
in dealing with questions of responsibility and commitability, must do
at least two things. First, he must formulate some notion of what he
means by mental disease. Second, he must decide whether the condi-
tion of the individual comes within that meaning. In other words, he
must formulate some idea-whether precise and explicit or vague and
implicit-of the characteristics of mental disease, and he must then
decide whether the condition of the individual falls inside or outside
of that class.
A. Can the Meaning of Mental Disease Be Found as an
Objective Fact? 95
Can the legal decision maker look for the meaning of mental
disease in nature, to be discovered by scientists? In the past, this may
93 "Does treatableness have any bearing on whether a condition is classified as
a mental disease? If so, is it true that there are some types of psychoses . . . which
are recognized by all to be mental diseases but which are not treatable?" United
States v. Amburgey, 189 F. Supp. 687, 695 (D.D.C. 1960) (Youngdahl, J. ). (Foot-
note omitted.) See also Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 609, 611 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (dissenting opinion).
94 See, e.g., discussion in Wolfenden Report, pp. 411-12 supra.
95 The intended meaning of the term objective fact is that stated by Hempel in
the following passage: "Science aims at knowledge that is objective in the sense of
being inter-subjectively certifiable, independently of individual opinion or preference,
on the basis of data obtainable by suitable experiments or observations." Hempel,
Introduction to Problems of Taxonomy, in FIELD STUDIES IN THE MENTAL DISORDERS
3, 7-8 (Zubin ed. 1961).
The general question of whether mental disease is a fact may arise apart from
the legal setting. A tripartite answer may be given:
a. Questions concerning what is existing usage are factual questions.
b. "Proper" definition of mental disease is not a fact.
c. Where a stated definition is taken as "stipulated" or "given" for purposes
of asking and answering the question, then the question "Is this a case of
mental disease?" is a factual question.
See Reid, Logical Aialysis, 114 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 397, 400 (1957): "[D]efinitions
constitute necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of answering empirical questions."
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have been the prevailing view in law " and in medicine; traces of this
approach can still be found in both of these fields and in the con-
temporary thinking of laymen. 7 This view, however, is inconsistent
with present knowledge of the world." Since there are alternatives
which are consistent, it can be discarded.
B. Is the Decision Maker Directed To Find the Meaning of Mental
Disease in Contemporary Medical Usage?
Another question is whether statutes which use the term mental
disease impliedly direct the legal decision maker to find the meaning
of that term in contemporary medical usage within the state, the
United States, or throughout the world. One difficulty is that medical
usage is conflicting and changing; there may be no satisfactory way
of determining what the prevailing meaning is.
Even if there were uniformity among psychiatrists, however, a
basic objection would remain. Value choices, which resolve them-
selves into questions of social philosophy, are involved in the meaning
of mental disease. When value choices are at stake, the view of a
single professional group cannot be accepted unquestioned. Unless
the prevailing usage of the term mental disease in medicine conforms
to a social philosophy which legislatures and courts find sound in rela-
tion to the applicability of compulsory legal measures, it would be
impolitic and unjust to adopt that usage.
96 See, e.g., Letter From Judge Charles Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court to Dr. John E. Tyler, Professor of Mental Diseases, Harvard Medical School,
Sept. 5, 1866, in Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the
Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183, 187 (1953) : "What is a diseased
condition of mind is to be settled by science and not by law,-disease is wholly within
the realm of natural law or the law of nature. The municipal, civil law established
by men for human government does not declare what is disease of the mind any more
than it declares what is disease of the lungs or the liver." (Emphasis added.)
97 See note 69 supra.
98 MAY, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAz DisEAsE 29 (1958): "A definition is but a
tool; there is no absolute definition of anything." Reid, Logical Analysis, 114 Am.
J. PsycaLATRY 397, 398 (1957):
[I]t seems obvious that classes, in any pragmatically relevant sense of
the word, are not ontological realities existing in nature independently of
our purposes and selections. It is not Nature . . . who sternly fixes limits
to our classes. . . . Nature, in the romantic tradition as in sober fact, is
indifferent, protean, and inexhaustible. It is our need to conquer that leads
us to divide and to select out of the infinite possibilities . . . those properties
that we feel best serve our purposes. . ..
Consider also Stengel's observation about even contemporary medical thinking
that "the quest for disease entities has created the idea that our diagnostic concepts
stand for biological realities with which it would be wrong to tamper." Stengel,
Classification of Mental Disorders, 21 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 601, 612
(1959).
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C. Does the Term Mental Disease Have Any Independent Meaning
of Its Own? 99
One other possible meaning of mental disease may be what the
judge, juror, or medical expert thinks best in a particular case. Such
an extraordinary proposition could seriously be put forward only in
relation to the role of medical experts. Presumably, such a suggestion
would imply that such medical determinations would not really be
unguided, but would be influenced by professional norms.' But,
except as guided by present law, there is no existing body of pro-
fessional norms concerning the applicability and nonapplicability of
compulsory measures. The basic difficulty is again one of value
preferences.
D. The Meaning of Mental Disease Should Be Based on
Reasoned Analysis
Any definition of mental disease and mental health, to be accept-
able for use in connection with legal compulsion, cannot depend upon
a supposed meaning to be found in nature, nor-since value questions
are involved--can it be based on some hypothetical vote among
psychiatrists, or an unguided delegation of discretion to the decision
maker. Ultimately, it must be founded upon a reasoned analysis.
The definition proposed here is an attempt at such analysis. It is
based upon a core of traditional usage. The value preferences involved
are explicit; they relate to intrapsychic functioning and not to conduct.
They have long been matters of common agreement and are likely to
remain so. It is hoped that the proposed definition is also clear and
definite.
E. Content of the Statutory Definition
Where classification as mental disease is explicitly made relevant
in a statute, what should the legislature say, if anything, about the
meaning it there intends for that term? Some of the conceptual
groundwork for answering this question has been provided in this
99 See, e.g., RocHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 29 (1958): "[C]riminals differ from
mentally ill people only in the manner we choose to deal with them."
100 Speaking about criminal justice, Remington puts a question whose current
legal import goes far beyond that particular subject matter:
What are the relative roles of legal and professional norms of decision?
As expertness increases there is a corresponding desire on the part of the
experts to minimize the role of legal norms as methods of controlling impor-
tant decisions. The relationship between legal norms and professional norms
as means of insuring the responsible exercise of official power is therefore,
of basic concern.
Remington, Crininal Justice Research, 51 J. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 7, 16 (1960).
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Article. Depending on the legislative purpose, a provision might ex-
clude conduct norms from the classification 101 or explicitly refer to
subdivisions of functioning 0 2 However, in view of the great broaden-
ing of psychiatric activities and concepts, it may well be no longer
legislatively sound to follow the usual past practice of saying nothing
explicit about the meaning of inental discase in legal contexts.0 3
101 See MoDE. PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), a provision
addressed to repeated violation of criminal law or other conduct norms quoted in
text accompanying note 8 supra.
A provision excluding from the statutory classification of mental disorder those
conduct norms relating to promiscuity or other immorality is included in Mental
Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72:
§ 4. Definition and classification of mental disorder.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be construed as implying that a person
may be dealt with under this Act as suffering from mental disorder, or from
any form of mental disorder described in this section, by reason only of
promiscuity or other immoral conduct.
102 See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-1(1) (1953), as amended, Colo. Sess. Laws
1957, ch. 162, § 1.1.1(1), which speaks of "mental or emotional functions."
103 For the recommendation that the word "psychopath," as used in proposed
legislation involving compulsory measures, should not be further defined, see Royal
Comm'n on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, Report, CMD.
No. 169, 11 357, at 127 (1957). This recommendation was criticized in Morils, Royal
Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency, 21 MODERN
L. REv. 63, 66-67 (1958).
The Mental Health Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72, which came after the Royal
Commission's report, rejected the Commission's definitional point, and contained the
following provision:
§ 4. Definition and classification of mental disorder . ...
(4) In this Act "psychopathic disorder" means a persistent disorder or
disability of mind (whether or not including subnormality of intelligence)
which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on
the part of the patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical treatment.
See also § 4(5), quoted in note 101 supra.
